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Abstract
The War on Terror is not limited to the United States, but rather, requires the cooperation
and dedication of European allies which also have suffered from deadly terrorist attacks. A casu-
alty of President Bush’s foreign policy at times during his term was the alienation of the United
States’ traditional European allies which have acquired invaluable experience in counterterrorist
operations and strategy stemming from their historical circumstances. This Note will discuss the
historical differences between the U.S. and European attention and approaches to counterterror-
ism to provide a context in which to contrast the spectrum of national security wiretapping pro-
cedures, standards of evidence, and oversight systems in the United States, the United Kingdom
(”U.K”), and Germany. Part I briefly chronicles the historical derivation of the U.S. judiciary’s
response to electronic surveillance to recognize the broader philosophical and legal framework in
which national security wiretapping inaptly remains. Part II is a comparative analysis between the
United States and Europe: it discusses their differing notions of privacy and details their distinct
pre- and post-9/11 intelligence structures and wiretapping strategies, ultimately highlighting the
Europeans’ savvied practicality for counterterrorism, which the German and British nonjudicial
approaches to national security wiretapping best exemplify. Part III calls for the abolition of the
FISC and the subsequent adoption of elements of the German and British procedures, evidentiary
thresholds, and models of oversight for U.S. national security wiretapping involving foreign intel-
ligence, with the recognition that such changes must conform to the U.S. system of checks and
balances if Congress is to assume the role of overseer.
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout the Cold War, the legislative and executive
branches of the U.S. government advocated a comprehensive
and relatively bipartisan approach to contain the expansionism
of the Soviet Union.' Before this half-century struggle against
"international"2 communism annexed its attention, the United
States struck a Faustian bargain with the Soviet Union to achieve
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1. For a comparison of Cold War and post-Cold War trends in political consensus
on foreign policy decision making, see James M. McCormick et al., Politics and
Bipartisanship at the Water's Edge: A Note on Bush and Clinton, 30 POLITY 133, 146 (1977)
(asserting decreased bipartisanship following the conclusion to the Cold War); Eugene
Wittkopf & James McCormick, Congress, the President, and the End of the Cold War: Has
Anything Changed?. 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 440, 457 (1988) (noting "greater discord"
between Congress and the President after the Cold War).
2. See WALTER MEAD, SPECIAL PROVIDENCE: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND How
IT CHANGED THE WORLD 61 (2001) (briefly discussing mythology propagated by Cold
War U.S. politicians of Soviet-directed and globally-united "international communism"
to more broadly address why segments of the U.S. populace mobilize in support of
certain foreign policy actions). For a brief run-through of how leaders have sought to
harness the support of particular segments of the U.S. citizenry in national security and
foreign policy initiatives, see Lawrence Gelfand, American Foreign Policy and Public
Opinion: Some Concerns For Scholars, 5 REVIEWS AM. HIST. 418, 418-425 (1977).
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victory in the Second World War.' With the defeat of Nazi
Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan, the United States
expeditiously embarked on a new crusade against its former
Faustian counterpart, painfully realizing through recurrences of
military blunder and overextension4 that, to prevent the global
spread of communism, it must remember to employ an arsenal
with more diversity than mere military might and venture.5  By
strategically culling from a mixed quiver of political, economic,
rhetorical, psychological, technological, and ideological arrows,
the United States merged a potency of nuance persistent enough
to pierce the heart of the "Evil Empire,"6 with history as
3. SeeJOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF
POSTWAR AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 3 (1982) (emphasizing the bitterness of
thy enemy's enemy alliance between Joseph Stalin and Franklin Delano Roosevelt by
Roosevelt's quoting of an Old Balkan proverb to analogize his relationship with Stalin to
walking with the Devil); Richard Ebeling, President of the Found. for Econ. Educ.,
Speech at Evenings at FEE: Dancing with the Devil: Roosevelt, Stalin, and the Lasting
Legacy of the Yalta Conference (Feb. 5, 2005), in NOTES FROM FEE (Found. for Econ.
Educ., Irvington, N.Y.), Mar. 2005, at 1 (commenting on the repercussions of
Roosevelt's dance with Devil).
4. For a lengthy analysis of the ineptitudes of the Truman administration during
the Korean War, see DAVID REES, KOREA: THE LIMITED WAR (1964). For a discussion of
government dysfunction during the Vietnam War, see James Thomson, Jr., How Could
Vietnam Happen? An Autopsy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1968, at 47; IRVING JANIS,
GROUPTHINK 97-130 (1982). For a concise analysis of the Bush administration's
approach leading up to the Iraq War as a means of comparison to the aforementioned
military entanglements of the Cold War, see James Rubin, Stumbling into War, 82
FOREIGN AFF. 46, 46-66 (Sept.-Oct. 2003).
5. See GADDIS, supra note 3, at 40 (documenting warnings of "excessive reliance on
the military"); see also GEORGE F. KENNAN, MEMOIRS: 1925-1950, at 304 (1967)
(contemplating victory in the "Long Telegram" by outlasting the Soviets in a war of wills
with constant and vigilant containment achieved through many means); WALTER A.
MCDOUGALL, PROMISED LAND, CRUSADER STATE: THE AMERICAN ENCOUNTER WITH THE
WORLD SINCE 1776, at 167 (1997) (contending the U.S. Cold War response called for
comprehensive defiance); Melvyn P. Leffler, The American Conception of National Security
and the Beginnings of the Cold War: 1945-48, 89 AM. HIST. REV. 346, 371 (1968)
(emphasizing a strategy of bolstering economic and social pressures against Soviet
communism, not merely trumpeting war).
6. See Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, Address Before National
Association of Evangelicals: Evil Empire Speech (Mar. 8, 1983), available at
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/30883b.htm (demonstrating
that, through charged rhetoric, Reagan was as adept as any politician during the Cold
War in portraying Soviet communism as a war against evil, carefully crafting the struggle
as an ideological crusade that must be won for the preservation of core democratic and
human values); see also HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 765-66 (1994) (describing
uniqueness of Reagan in vivifying threats through sermonizing oratory and uniting
country under common purpose and pride). For a general discussion of the origins of
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testament to the success of this multipronged strategy in
stabilizing the world order during the Cold War and advancing
U.S. triumph.7
In a post-9/11 world, the magnitude of the challenge and
comprehensiveness of the strategy are similar to those of the
Cold War, but of a vastly different character.8 The United States
does not face a rational state actor deterred by mutually assured
destruction,9 but a faceless, global terrorist organization devoted
to religious fanaticism and martyrdom.'" The United States must
continue to adapt to a new enemy, as it deftly did following
World War II, by reassessing and broadening its strategy to meet
a uniquely different challenge, the War on Terror."' The 9/11
the perceived uniqueness of the United States as a promised land, a notion known as
"American exceptionalism," see McDOUGALL, supra note 5, at 20; see also John
Winthrop, Puritan leader and governor, Sermon: A Model of Christian Charity (1630)
(analogizing United States to Matthew 5:14 quote: "Ye are the light of the world. A city
that is set on a hill cannot be hid.").
7. See GADDIS, supra note 3, at 40 (noting innovation presents more potential for
long-term success than armed force); Melvyn Leffler, The Cold War: What Do "We Now
Know"?, 104 AM. HIST. REv. 501, 505 (1999) (contrasting Soviet dependence on military
power alone with diverse power and appeal of democratic capitalism).
8. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (quoting the government's
concession that the unconventionality of the War on Terror makes it "unlikely to end
with a formal cease-fire agreement"); Daniel Pipes, Twilight Struggles: The Cold War and
the Terror War, Alike and Not Alike, NAT'L REv., Apr. 5, 2004, at 22 (differentiating Soviet
practicality and reasonability from the irrationality of Islamic extremism); Nicholas Allen
Kenney, Terrorism: How It Is Unlike the Cold War, AM. DIPL., Jan. 24, 2003,
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives-roll/2003_ 01-03/essay_2and3/
essay2_kenney.html (exploring challenges of prosecuting wars against enemies of
dissimilar form and nature).
9. See Richard Betts, The New Threat Of Mass Destruction: What If McVeigh Had Used
Anthrax?, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 27 (noting that the threat has changed and
standard strategies employed against the Soviet Union are not as applicable); see also
Christopher Chyba, Toward Biological Security, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2002, at 122-23
(illustrating the obsolescence of the old approaches to thwart terrorist weapons of mass
destruction attacks, specifically biological ones).
10. For an understanding of the current threat and the recent history to precede it,
see generally ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA: GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERROR
(2002); Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon, America and the New Terrorism, SURVIVAL,
Spring 2000, at 59; Jason Burke, Think Again: Al Qaeda, FOREIGN POL'Y, May-June 2004,
at 18; Martha Crenshaw, Why America? The Globalization of Civil War, CURRENT HISTORY,
Dec. 2001, at 425; Audrey Kurth Cronin, Behind the Curve: Globalization and International
Terrorism, INT'L SECURIfY, Winter 2002-2003, at 30.
11. See Scott Atran, Mishandling Suicide Terrorism, WASH. Q., Summer 2004, at 67
(arguing that the United States, Israel, Russia, and other nations on the front line in the
War on Terror must understand that military and counterinsurgency measures are
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Commission Report stressed that long-term success requires the
adoption of "all elements of national power": statecraft,
intelligence gathering, covert operations, law enforcement,
economic policy, working alliances, and securing the home
front.12  Wiretapping must be part of that comprehensive
counterterrorist strategy. 13  But application of any
counterterrorist measure cannot and should not exist apart from
the republican framework and democratic philosophy of the U.S.
government, as the words of Benjamin Franklin indelibly
forewarn that sacrificing liberty for security protects neither.
14
In the pursuit of intercepting terrorist communications
following September 11, 2001, the National Security Agency's
("NSA") warrantless wiretaps circumvented the executive-power-
tactical, not strategic, reactions to suicide terrorism); see also Siobhan Gorman, Homeland
Security-Second-Class Security, 36 NAT'L J. 1336 (2004) (discussing the Bush
administration's more sustained focus on waging battle against terrorism in the foreign
arena rather than protecting the home front, with post-9/11 homeland security a
secondary concern relative to resources invested in foreign ventures); Robert A. Pape,
The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, AM. POL. SCI. REV., Aug. 2003, at 1, 14 (positing
that "homeland security and defensive efforts must be a core part of any solution," not
solely offensive military action).
12. See THOMAS H. KEAN ET AL., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 363-64
(2004) [hereinafter THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT] (listing a series of
recommendations to prevent another 9/11 attack); see also THE WHITE HOUSE,
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 12 (2003),
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/
counter-terrorism/counter terrorism-strategy.pdf (defining victory against Al Qaeda,
because of the nature of the War on Terror, as more elusive than past conflicts with
treaty signing ceremonies capturing a "single, defining moment" of success).
13. See John Yoo, The Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Constitution, 14 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 565, 572 (2007) (pointing out that not even critics question the
importance of wiretapping in preventing Al Qaeda plots against America); War Power,
NAT'L REV., Feb. 27, 2006, at 14, 16 (articulating the importance of wiretapping for the
executive branch to wage a successful War on Terror).
14. For an account of Franklin's musings on government and diplomacy, see
WALTER ISAACSON, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: AN AMERICAN LIFE (2003). For a discussion of
the nexus of security and liberty, see Laura Donohue, Fear Itself Counterterrorism,
Individual Rights, and U.S. Foreign Relations Post 9-11, in TERRORISM &
COUNTERTERRORISM, 313, 332 (Russell D. Howard & Reid L. Sawyer eds., 2002)
(emphasizing that raison d'etat (reason of the state) intensifies if attacks jeopardize a
state's existence, and becomes pretext for extraordinary actions); see also Oliver Revell,
Counterterrorism and Democratic Values: An American Practitioner's Experience, in CLOSE
CALLS: INTERVENTION, TERRORISM, MISSILE DEFENSE, AND 'JUST WAR' TODAY, 237, 247
(Elliott Abrams ed., 1998) (musing that a dilemma inheres in U.S. citizens not entirely
trusting government but expecting it to provide them protection).
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limiting Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"),15
engendering a fierce reaction from civil libertarians and some
constitutionalists.'6 Their arguments should warrant attention
and elicit concern,"7 for the Bush administration and some legal
scholars had argued that the President's authorization of the
NSA to wiretap outside of the FISA-warrant framework under the
so-called Terrorist Surveillance Program ("TSP") is an inherent
and unfettered executive power to protect the nation combined
in the take care, vesting, and commander-in-chief clauses of
Article II of the U.S. Constitution-the basis for the Unitary
Executive Theory. 18  There is grave danger in an unchecked
executive ordering wiretaps without oversight in a war without
foreseeable end. 9 Given the history of unrestricted executive
wiretapping during wartime, on the other hand, minimizing or
15. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11, 1821-29, 184146, 1861-62 (2006).
16. See Dan Eggen & Dafna Linzer, Judge Rules Against Wiretaps: NSA Program Called
Unconstitutional, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2006, at A01 (noting Judge Anna Taylor's opinion
that it was not the intent of the Framers to grant the President uninhibited power such
that his actions may jeopardize freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights); see also Maria
Godoy, The NSA: America's Eavesdropper-in-Chief NPR, Feb. 3, 2006,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5187293 (providing a history of
the U.S. government's excesses intercepting communications, to warn of a repeat).
17. SeeJeremy Neff, Comment, Does (FISA + NSA) - AUMF - Hamdi = Illegal Domestic
Spying?, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 916 (2006) (arguing that courts must preserve U.S.
liberty from governmental intrusion); James Bamford, Op-Ed., Bush Is Not Above the Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, at A19 (likening warrantless wiretapping to subversion of the
Constitution).
18. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the
National Security Agency Described by the President 1-42 (Jan. 19, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf (presenting legal
authorities to support the President's ability to wiretap without warrants); see also Yoo,
supra note 13, at 567-72 (detailing the constitutional provisions of Article II and the
history of U.S. hostilities to demonstrate the inherent and recognized ability of the
executive to wiretap in the interest of national security, without warrants). For a history
of executive usurpation of power from other branches of government, see generally
Steven Calabresi & Christopher Yoo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2001
(NW. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW: PUB. LAW & LEGAL THEORY PAPERS, Paper 12, 2004),
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps/plltp/artl2/. But see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.,
Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952) (explicitly rejecting the argument of
merging three Article II clauses to justify reserved powers of the executive during
wartime).
19. See A Debate Between Professor David Cole and Professor Ruth Wedgwood, 37
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 509, 514-15 (2006) (evaluating dangers of unchecked
presidential power in the context of the wiretapping debate); see also Youngstown, 343
U.S. at 587 (restraining power of executive branch to act uninhibitedly during wartime).
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altogether removing judicial oversight of select national security
probes may not be such a radical departure from the United
States' historical commitment to liberty.2" To recognize the
legitimate countervailing security and liberty concerns but
disabuse the notion of a per se incompatibility, this Note
maintains that national security wiretapping law should balance
these two interests to faithfully abide by the principles of the
Constitution.2 This Note proposes, however, that, to reach an
equilibrium of beneficial reciprocity between security and liberty
pursuits, the U.S. Congress should supplant the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") as the primary overseer
branch monitoring national security wiretapping probes
involving foreign intelligence-an assumption of Article I power
long overdue. 22  Such a shift in oversight will restore the
legislative branch to what the Constitution intends it to be: a
coequal to the president in protecting this country from foreign-
sponsored threats. 23  Confronting the threats of the Cold War
healthily highlighted moments of great cooperation and tension
20. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 18, at 14 (noting the consistency of no
judicial oversight of electronic surveillance during the history of U.S. warfare in order to
preserve for the President a fundamental tool of war). But see Youngstown, 343 U.S. at
610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (reminding that tradition and practice "cannot
supplant the Constitution").
21. See David Ignatius, Eavesdropping and Evading the Law, WASH. POST, Dec. 28,
2005, at A21 (touting the effectiveness of wiretapping but calling for appropriate legal
safeguards). See generally James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers
Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al (weighing wiretapping in a dual prism of
liberty and security).
22. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring) (warning Congress to
not let power "slip[] through its fingers"); THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
12, at 105 (noting Congress' receding focus on national security in favor of domestic
priorities); Tim Roemer, Op-Ed., How to Fix Intelligence Oversight, WASH. POST, Dec. 20,
2007, at A29 (exhorting Congress to develop a more effective system of oversight).
23. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 10-18, § 9, cl. 2 (articulating designated powers
afforded to Congress to protect the nation); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552
(2004) (Souter,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (clarifying that the President is
not the commander-in-chief of the country, only the military); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S.
1, 26 (1942) (outlining Article I powers given to Congress to defend the country); see
also John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 1379, 1419-20 (1980) (encouraging Congress to meet its constitutional oversight
responsibilities and commit itself to accountability for future wars). See generally Aziz
Huq & Frederick Schwarz Jr., Push Back: Now Congress Must Check the White House to
Restore the Framers' Balance, LEGAL TIMES (Wash., D.C.), Apr. 16, 2007, at 66 (identifying
"long history" of congressional watchfulness over national security issues).
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between the legislative and executive branches24-in the way,
ironically, the founders designed and the courts affirmed it.2"
Functions of foreign affairs are not the appropriate jurisdiction
for a third branch of government unschooled in delicate national
security policy, without regular access to intelligence briefings,
and beholden to a set of inapplicable legal standards.26
The War on Terror is not limited to the United States, but
rather, requires the cooperation and dedication of European
allies,27 which also have suffered from deadly terrorist attacks.28
24. Compare RobertJohnson, Congress and the Cold War, J. COLD WAR STUD., Spring
2001, at 76 (discussing the importance of recognizing the influential role of Congress
during the Cold War), with Fr6d6rick Gagnon, A Cold War-like Consensus? Toward a
Theoretical Explanation of U.S. Congressional-Executive Relations Concerning National
Security Policy After 9/11, (Mar. 17, 2004) (presented at the 2004 International Studies
Association Annual Convention), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/
p72869jindex.html (analogizing congressional cooperation to subservience in effect).
See also JAMES NATHAN &JAMES K. OLIVER, FOREIGN POLICY MAKING AND THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 1-2 (1994) (outlining institutional tensions of government decision
making during the Cold War).
25. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 48 (James Madison) (postulating on the theory of
separation of powers and checks and balances); JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 263, 269, 275 (1980) (opining that the national political
process, not the judicial branch, should decide constitutional questions concerning the
intersecting powers of Congress and the President). Compare United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (claiming the President should be unfettered
in the realm of foreign relations), with Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006),
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), and Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (highlighting
collectively the line of later decisions limiting the power of the executive in a time of
war).
26. See Oetjen v. Centr. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (contending that
foreign policy is "committed by the Constitution" to the President and Congress, not the
judiciary); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)
(maintaining that courts do not have "aptitude, facilities nor responsibility" to make
foreign policy decisions, which are political and should be left to executive and
legislative discretion); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 579-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Court lacks expertise to second-guess the other two branches of government in the
realm of national security); Editorial, A Judge's Foreign Policy, NAT'L REV., Sept. 11, 2006,
at 15 (dismissing judges as ill-equipped to make foreign policy or national security
determinations).
27. See generally Jessica Fugate, Op-Ed., NATO in the Balance: United States Must
Nurture European Allies, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2002, at A15 (assessing the importance of
European allies to wage the War on Terror); Anthony Blinken, Winning the War of Ideas,
WASH. Q., Spring 2002, at 103 (arguing that success derives from both unilateral
projection of force and multilateralism, by the example of Spanish authorities refusing to
hand over alleged members of Al Qaeda linked to the September 11 attacks for fear of
the U.S. using secret trials before military tribunals).
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A casualty of President Bush's foreign policy at times during his
term was the alienation of the United States' traditional
European allies, 29 which have acquired invaluable experience in
counterterrorist operations and strategy stemming from their
historical circumstances.3" This Note will discuss the historical
differences between the U.S. and European attention and
approaches to counterterrorism to provide a context in which to
contrast the spectrum of national security wiretapping
procedures, standards of evidence, and oversight systems in the
United States, the United Kingdom ("U.K"), and Germany. Part
I briefly chronicles the historical derivation of the U.S. judiciary's
response to electronic surveillance to recognize the broader
philosophical and legal framework in which national security
wiretapping inaptly remains. Part II is a comparative analysis
between the United States and Europe: it discusses their
differing notions of privacy and details their distinct pre- and
post-9/11 intelligence structures and wiretapping strategies,
ultimately highlighting the Europeans' savvied practicality for
counterterrorism, which the German and British nonjudicial
approaches to national security wiretapping best exemplify. Part
III calls for the abolition of the FISC and the subsequent
28. SeeJAMES BECKMAN, COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACHES TO HOMELAND SECURITY
AND ANTI-TERRORISM (2007) (discussing the history of terrorist attacks in Great Britain,
Germany and Spain, both pre- and post-9/11); see, e.g., Elizabeth Nash, Madrid Bombers
'Were Inspired by Bin Laden Address', INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 7, 2006, at 18; Rosie
Cowan & Hugh Muir, Attack on London: Four Bombs in 50 Minutes-Britain Suffers Its
Worst-Ever Terrorist Attack, GUARDIAN (London),July 8, 2005, at 2.
29. See Walter Rodgers, et al, Analysis: Bush Leaves Europe Cold, CNN,Jan. 21, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/01/21/bush.analysis/ (noting that many
Europeans were not impressed with President Bush); PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE
PEOPLE & PRESS, A YEAR AFTER IRAQ WAR: MISTRUST OF AMERICA IN EUROPE EVER
HIGHER, MUSLIM ANGER PERSISTS (2004) http://pewglobal.org/reports/
display.php?PageID=797 (statistically analyzing poor image of America in Great Britain,
France, Germany, and Russia); see also Madeleine Albright, Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster?,
FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 7 (positing that Europeans and Americans sense
mutual incompatibility of viewpoints and priorities).
30. See RICHARD POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM
IN THE WAKE OF 9/11, at 163-97 (2005) (urging the United States to learn from
European struggles over longer period of time in fighting terrorism). See generally
Directorate-Gen., Justice Freedom and Sec., European Comm'n, Terrorism: The European
Response (Aug. 2004), http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/keyjissues/terrorism/
terrorism_0904_en.pdf (noting a total of five thousand deaths over thirty years resulting
from terrorism in the United Kingdom ("U.K."), Spain, and Ireland); BECKMAN, supra
note 28 (chronicling European initiatives to combat terrorism).
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adoption of elements of the German and British procedures,
evidentiary thresholds, and models of oversight for U.S. national
security wiretapping involving foreign intelligence, with the
recognition that such changes must conform to the U.S. system
of checks and balances if Congress is to assume the role of
overseer.
I. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF U.S. WIRETAPPING LAW
Part I traces the history of both U.S. criminal and national
security wiretapping law in the prism of privacy rights. What may
seem extraneous intends to establish deep historical and
philosophical differences with Europe. A broader context is also
relevant for a more profound understanding of the U.S.
approach to counterterrorism post-9/11.
A. History of Wiretapping Law Pre-FISA
The term "wiretapping" is increasingly difficult to define,
yet traditionally it denotes the interception of telephone
conversations.3 1 The jurisprudence of wiretapping, or more
broadly, electronic surveillance, 32 evolved in the early to mid-
twentieth century as the Supreme Court struggled with
nonphysical intrusions as sanctioned by or violative of the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution. 33  The landmark decision in
Olmstead v. United States held that the Fourth Amendment did not
include the intangible, such as phone calls, and thus a
31. See WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 151 (1998) (discussing that "communications
interception" is a more accurate term to capture the breadth of today's tapping targets,
such as faxes or e-mails); see also LIANE WORNER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF WIRETAPPING
AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE TO FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 60-63 (2004) (chronicling
statutory and case-based history and definitions of wiretapping). This Note has adopted
the term wiretapping in most instances because of its wide usage and connotation in
public and political discourse.
32. See WHITFIELD & LANDAU, supra note 31, at 156 (noting that electronic
surveillance includes both wiretapping and bugging face-to-face conversations);
WORNER, supra note 31, at 61-63 (distinguishing different types of electronic
communications and surveillance).
33. Compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding that
wiretapping is outside the Fourth Amendment), with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) (holding that wiretapping is within the Fourth Amendment).
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nontrespassory invasion did not qualify for constitutional
protection.34 Justice Brandeis, who, in his dissent, harkened to
the spirit of his memorable defense of privacy written over thirty
years earlier, 35 railed against the dangers posed to democracy by
"instruments of tyranny and oppression."36 His sentiments did
not go unnoticed, as the Court began to chip away at Olmstead in
subsequent decisions.37 Reaching a reversal in Katz v. United
States, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment safeguards
people, not places. 38  With this decision, the Court altered the
doctrine upon which U.S. wiretap law rested.39 Contrary to prior
decisions, which relied on statutory interpretation, Katz relied on
constitutional principles.40 The Katz Court did not extend its
holding to national security,4 1 although the Keith case later found
the purview of the Fourth Amendment to encompass purely
domestic national security wiretapping.
42
34. See 277 U.S. at 464 (reasoning that search and seizure restrictions do not
pertain to evidence "secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only").
35. See generally Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890) (detailingjustifications for the right to privacy).
36. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475-76 (Brandeis, J, dissenting) (criticizing the Court's
"literal construction" of the Fourth Amendment).
37. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding that information
gathered from warrantless wiretaps by federal agents was inadmissible); see also Nardone
v. United States 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (holding that indirect evidence derived from
warrantless wiretaps was inadmissible); Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S 321 (1939)
(minimizing the distinction between intrastate and interstate wiretapping).
38. See 389 U.S. at 351 (basing decision on emergent notions of privacy).
39. See Peter Swire, Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 904 (2004)
(declaring that the Katz decision revolutionized the conception of the scope of the
Fourth Amendment); see also Edmund Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth
Amendment, S. CT. REV. 133, 134 (1968) (noting the Supreme Court's shift with Katz in
interpreting the Fourth Amendment).
40. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (undertaking a Fourth Amendment analysis). See
generally WHITFIELD & LANDAU, supra note 31, at 167; ELIZABETH BAZAN, THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 2 (2002).
41. See Katz, 389 at 359-60, 364 (Douglas, J., concurring) (warning of the Court's
"unwarranted green light" to allow for warrantless wiretaps in the interest of national
security); WHITFIELD & LANDAU, supra note 31, at 176; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)
(1968) (repealed 1978) (providing that warrant requirements would not limit the
constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to
protect the nation).
42. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321-22 (1972) (declining
to broaden the scope of the President's surveillance power to activities of foreign powers
within or outside of the United States); see also United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629
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The Katz decision came two years after the Court had
expressed that "[v]arious guarantees create zones of privacy,"
implying rights to privacy in the Fourth Amendment and five
other amendments to the Constitution.43 Subsequent decisions"
would expand the right to privacy to three major areas: the right
to engage in sex and marriage, the right to have an abortion, and
the right to be free from searches that invade privacy.45  The
imperative of privacy was more evident as the excesses and, in
some cases, abuses of government became more visible and
known. 46 In January 1975, in the wake of the Watergate scandal,
the U.S. Senate appointed an eleven-member special committee
to examine and investigate wiretap abuses. 47  The so-called
Church Committee, named after its chairman U.S. Senator Frank
Church, concluded that the rampancy of government agency
spying and the resultant wealth of collected personal information
F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980) (stating that warrant requirements do not apply to
searches for foreign intelligence information).
43. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (holding that the right to
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship is a fight older than Bill of Rights). See
generally Robert Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law
of Privacy?, 64 MICH. L. REV. 197 (1965) (commenting on the evolution of the right to
privacy).
44. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy
encompasses a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy);
Eisenstadt v. Baird 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that the right to privacy extends to an
individual's, married or single, decision whether to bear or beget a child).
45. DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER &JON D. BIBLE, PRIVACY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT:
SEX, DRUGS, AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE 104 (1992) (enumerating three broad categories of
rights to privacy). For a discussion that specifically relates to privacy issues involving
wiretapping, see G. STEVENS & C. DOYLE, PRIVACY: WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC
EAVESDROPPING 1-67 (2002).
46. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 12, at 74-75 (mentioning a
precipitous drop in the favorability of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") in
American public opinion polls upon revelations of spying on political figures). See
generally STANLEY KUTLER, ABUSES OF POWER: THE NEW NIXON TAPES (1997) (reporting
an in-depth look at Nixon and his administration's secret and illegal actions).
47. See DONALD MUSCH, CML LIBERTIES AND THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT 3 (2003) (framing the history preceding the passage of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA")); U.S. Senate, Church Committee Created,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/histoy/minute/
ChurchCommitteeCreated.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2009) (briefly reviewing the
formation of the Church Committee).
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exceeded the bounds of necessity.4" The government defended
its actions as necessary to secure national security interests, yet
the Committee uncovered that the government's activities clearly
extended into unrelated matters.49  The result of the
Committee's efforts, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, intended to govern national security investigations
concerning foreign intelligence by requiring a court order to
wiretap statutorily enumerated entities or persons. 50
B. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FISA requires that a surveillance order come from one of
eleven district court judges constituting the FISC, with each
judge appointed by the ChiefJustice of the United States to serve
no more than a term of seven years.5' In addition, the Chief
Justice appoints three judges to serve on the FISA Court of
Review, which has jurisdiction to review denials of applications
under FISA.52  Under the specified classifications of FISA,
"foreign powers" 53 or "agents of a foreign power,"'54 the latter of
which includes the subclass of "U.S. persons" 55 as agents of a
foreign power, are subject to wiretapping probes if the guidelines
for the issuance of an order are properly followed.56 FISA
established that the evidentiary standard of probable cause is
necessary to warrant labeling a target of electronic surveillance a
foreign power or agent of a foreign power, and to determine if
the facilities or places kept under surveillance are being or are
48. See MUSCH, supra note 47, at 4 (listing intelligence community practices
warranting increased regulation); see also WHITFIELD & LANDAU, supra note 31, at 178
(speaking to the distrust of government and call to action post-Watergate).
49. See MUSCH, supra note 47, at 3-4 (discussing abuses of power in intelligence
activities); THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 12, at 75 (citing excesses of
intelligence gathering efforts).
50. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11, 1821-29, 1841-46, 1861-62 (2006); see also WHITFIELD &
LANDAU, supra note 31, at 179-80 (discussing the basic premise of FISA).
51. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a), (d).
52. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b).
53. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (a).
54. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b).
55. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (i).
56. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804, 1805(a) (2006).
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about to be used by a foreign power or agent of a foreign
power.5
7
In making a probable cause determination, a judge may
account for prior activities, along with "facts and circumstances"
concerning the current or future activities of the target.58 A
probable cause threshold is not, however, a requirement for
establishing if a foreign power or agent of a foreign power that is
not a U.S. person had or would commit a crime, although these
respective classifications may predicate some criminal
wrongdoing.59  U.S. persons identified as agents of a foreign
power receive a higher evidentiary ceiling than their foreign
counterparts because their classification either premises or
potentially involves criminal activity.6" FISA provides for criminal
sanctions 61 and civil liability62 for prohibited activities.
As a constitutional compromise of roles for the three
branches of government, FISA did not receive much public
criticism from 1978 to 2001.63 In the fallout from the 9/11
attacks, however, FISA garnered increased scrutiny for the so-
called "wall" erected between the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI") and the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice ("DOJ") inhibiting the FBI and other intelligence
agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") and
NSA from sharing intelligence information with criminal
investigators. 64  The wall's origins stem from the 1995 DOJ
57. 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (a)(2)(A), (B).
58. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(b).
59. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a), (b)(1).
60. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (b) (2).
61. 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (2006).
62. 50 U.S.C. § 1810 (2006). Lack of notice prevents the pursuit of remedies. See
id. For a discussion of the "notice problem" for those entities or individuals
unknowingly subject to unlawful electronic surveillance, see Andrew Adler, The Notice
Problem, Unlawful Electronic Surveillance, and Civil Liability Under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393 (2007).
63. See JAMES BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURnIY LAW FOR
PERILOUS TIMES 84 (2007) (discussing the mild history of FISA before 9/11); Beryl
Howell, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Has the Solution Become a Problem?, in
PROTECTING W14AT MATTERS: TECHNOLOGY, SECURI , AND LIBERTY SINCE 9/11, at 118
(2006) (illustrating post-9/11 developments as prompting concern with FISA).
64. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 12, at 78-79 (providing a concise
look at the construction of the FISA "wall," but ultimately calling the term misleading
because of other obstacles that too prevented an intelligence exchange); see also Clayton
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procedures initially intended to manage intelligence information
sharing between DOJ prosecutors and the FBI, which became so
"misunderstood and misapplied" that FBI intelligence and
criminal operatives came to believe that they could not share
information with one another.65 The USA PATRIOT Act looked
to bridge the divide between law enforcement and intelligence
operatives by amending the language of FISA from requiring that
"the purpose of surveillance was intelligence" to requiring that it
be "a significant purpose," a shift intended to facilitate
intelligence gathering and sharing.66 Congress also legalized the
use of roving wiretaps to allow a FISC judge to permit
surveillance without specifying a particular telephone or
carrier. 67 It is evident in these few examples that Congress has
acted to update FISA, with more recent legislation intending to
further that effect.68
The disclosure of the NSA warrantless wiretapping program
compounded the worries of those already concerned by the
perceived loss of civil liberties following the passage of the USA
PATRIOT Act.6 9 Although details remain largely classified, the
Northouse, Providing Security and Protecting Liberty, in PROTECTING WHAT MATTERS:
TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY, AND LIBERTY SINCE 9/11, at 13 (Clayton Northouse ed., 2006)
(noting that the design of FISA was to preclude prosecutors from using it to sidestep
more demanding requirements of regular criminal investigations).
65. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 12, at 79 (chronicling missteps
to misreading Department OfJustice procedures).
66. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001)
(amending 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (1982)) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §
1804(a) (6) (B) (2006)). See generally BAKER, supra note 63, at 85; Howell, supra note 63,
at 123-26. For a critical analysis of the "significant purpose" test, see George Varghese, A
Sense of Purpose: The Role of Law Enforcement in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 152 U. PA.
L. REV. 385 (2003).
67. USA PATRIOT Act § 206 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2000)),
amended by USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 109 P.L. 177,
§ 102(b), 120 Stat. 192, 195 (2006). See generally Northouse, supra note 64, at 15.
68. The Protect America Act of 2007 ("PAA"), Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552
(2007), modernized FISA in four ways: collection of foreign intelligence on targets
outside the United States does not require court approval, § 2, FISC review of procedures
directed by the government at persons "reasonably believed" to be outside the United
States, § 3, third party assistance for intelligence gathering efforts is permissible, § 2, and
protection of third party assistants from private lawsuits, id. The PAA became the basis
for the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, as many of its provisions were reauthorized. See
Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008).
69. See Godoy, supra note 16 (expressing dismay at the government overstepping its
constitutional bounds); see also Tom Daschle, Op-Ed., Power We Didn't Grant, WASH.
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DOJ stated that the warrantless wiretapping of communications
was limited to where at least one party was outside the United
States, and where there was "a reasonable basis to conclude that
one party to the communication [was] a member of al Qaeda,
affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization
affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in support of al Qaeda."'70
The DOJ justified the program as permissible under both Article
II of the Constitution and the Authorization for the Use of
Military Force passed by Congress a week after September 11,
2001.71 Opponents not only argued that lowering the standard of
probable cause was in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but
cited the lopsided statistics of wiretapping approvals by the FISC
as proof that FISA did not hinder intelligence gathering efforts.72
They stressed that failures of analysis and inter- and intra-agency
disunity, not overly demanding evidentiary standards, were more
responsible for the failure to thwart 9/11.
73
The defenders of the program pointed to examples of
evidentiary and procedural impediments that arose under FISA
in prosecuting an unconventional War on Terror.7 4 In testimony
to the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2006, Mary DeRosa, a
Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International
PoST, Dec. 23, 2005, at A21 (arguing against an expansive interpretation of the powers
delegated to the President by congressional legislation).
70. See The White House, Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and
General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence (Dec. 19,
2005), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/1 2/
20051219-1.html (justifying the adequacy of the "reasonable basis" test in affording
protections to targets of electronic surveillance).
71. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 18, at 1-2 (claiming both constitutional
supremacy and, as a secondary argument, statutorily granted authority).
72. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Orders 1979-2006
(May 2, 2008), http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisastats.html (reporting statistics
from the FISA court that facially show that it has acted pre- and post-9/11 as a "rubber
stamp").
73. See Testimony of Jerry Berman Before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence on "Amending FISA: The National Security and Privacy Concerns Raised by
S.2659 and S. 2586," http://www.cdt.org/testimony/020731berman.shtml ("The FBI
lacks the ability to properly analyze the information it already collects.").
74. See Yoo, supra note 13, at 572-73 (listing obstacles to intelligence gathering
under FISA); see also Fixing FISA, NAT'L REV., Oct. 15, 2007,
http://article.nationalreview.com/
?q=OTQ2NmE3MGMwZDMyYzAwN2E4NjQ4MjU2YWY1NzhIOTc= (arguing FISA stifles
maximization of U.S. technological superiority and ability to protect citizenry).
1962 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:1947
Studies, cited "unduly difficult and time-consuming"
administrative procedures for obtaining a warrant as the most
common complaint about the FISA process.7 5 In May 2002, FBI
Special Agent Coleen Rowley wrote in a memo to the Director of
the FBI of the "common perception" that a denial of a probable
cause warrant in the criminal system presumed failing the "smell
test" for FISA.7 6 The FBI perception, according to Rowley, of "an
excessively high standard of probable cause in terrorism" 77
became the subject in February 2003 of the Senate Judiciary
Committee's inquiry into FISA implementation failures.78 In a
telling exchange between Senator Arlen Specter and a "key [FBI]
Headquarters SSA [Supervisory Special Agent]," the latter
"stated that he did not know the legal standard for obtaining a
warrant under FISA. ''79  Remarkably, an unnamed attorney for
the FBI was not familiar with the controlling standard of
probable cause, conveying that the FBI "did not have written
procedures concerning the definition of 'probable cause' in FISA
cases."" ° The report authored by Senator Specter and two other
75. FISA for the 21st Century: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
279 (2006) (statement of Mary DeRosa, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies) (urging Congress to streamline FISA procedures).
76. See Coleen Rowley's Memo to FBI Director Robert Mueller, TIME MAGAZINE, May 21,
2002, http://www.time.com/time/naion/article/0,8599,249997,00.html (emoting that
this misperception was so potent that she was "afraid" to act otherwise).
77. Id. (arguing for a new probable cause procedure to unburden "terrorism cases
where time is of the essence").
78. PATRICK J. LEAHY ET AL., FBI OVERSIGHT IN THE 107TH CONGRESS BY THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: FISA IMPLEMENTATION FAILURES: AN INTERIM REPORT
16-18 (2003), available at http://specter.senate.gov/files/specterspeaks/ACF6.pdf,
reprinted in 149 CONG. REC. 4534 (documenting not only the concerns of the Rowley
Memo, but a litany of FBI dysfunctions).
79. Id. at 29, reprinted in 149 CONG REC. 4537 (stating that not only did the
Supervisory Special Agent not know the legal standard for FISA warrants, but "did not
have a clear understanding" of probable cause).
80. Id. at 30, reprinted in 149 CONG. REC. 4537. A relevant portion of the report
states:
Sen. Specter: . . . [Attorney #1] what is the legal standard for probable
cause for a warrant?
[Attorney #1]: A reasonable belief that the facts you are trying to prove
are accurate.
Question: Reason to believe?
[Attorney #1]: Reasonable belief.
Question: Reasonable belief?
[Attorney #1 ]: More probable than not.
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senators on the committee even admitted that " [g] iving a precise
definition of probable cause is not an easy task."'" The Director
of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell testified to the
House Judiciary Committee in September 2007 that a showing of
probable cause expends "substantial expert resources toward
preparing applications ... [diverting them] from the job of
analyzing collection results and finding new leads, to writing
justifications that would demonstrate their targeting selections
would satisfy the statute," creating an "intolerable situation."8 2
Professor John Yoo of the University of California at
Berkeley School of Law has asserted that FISA is a detriment to
the rapidity with which U.S. intelligence agencies must move to
uncover and foil inchoate terrorist plots.83 He underscored that
FISA and the USA PATRIOT Act falsely presuppose that it is not
overly difficult to determine who is involved in terrorist activity.8 4
He bemoaned the government's high burden to establish the
rough equivalent of probable cause for the criminal justice
system; that an encumbering Cold War process ossifies the
distinct national security surveillance imperatives of the War on
Terror; and that bureaucratic impediments slow down the
Question: More probable than not?
[Attorney #1 ]: Yes, sir. Not a preponderance of the evidence.
Question: Are you familiar with "Gates v. Illinois"?
[Attorney #1]: No, sir.
However, "more probable than not" is not the standard; rather, "only
the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the
standard of probable cause."
Id., reprinted in 149 CONG. REC. 4537.
81. Id., reprinted in 149 CONG. REC. 4537. "Yet, even with the inherent difficulty in
this standard we are concerned that senior FBI officials offered definitions that imposed
heightened proof requirements." Id., reprinted in 149 CONG. REC. 4537.
82. Warrantless Surveillance and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: The
Role of Checks and Balances in Protecting Americans' Privacy Rights (Part II): Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 21 (2007) (statement ofJ.M. McConnell,
Director of National Intelligence) (speaking specifically to surveying targets outside the
United States); see also Byron York, Why Bush Approved the Wiretaps: Not Long Ago, Both
Parties Agreed the FISA Court Was a Problem, NAT'L REV., Dec. 19, 2005,
http://vww.nationalreview.com/york/york200512l9l334.asp (highlighting
burdensome process of seeking FISA warrants).
83. SeeYoo, supra note 13, at 572-74 (railing against "bureaucratic impediments" to
intercepting Al Qaeda communications).
84. See id. at 572-73 (recognizing continued flaws of antiterrorism legislation in
providing optimal security provisions).
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needle-in-a-haystack search for potential terrorist operations
during the crucial early stages. 8
5
Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit wrestled with relaxing the probable cause
standard to reasonable suspicion, but, as he noted, "even that
would be too restrictive. '" 86  By lowering the standard even
further, on the other hand, he concluded that "judges will have
no basis for refusing to grant the application."87 His solution for
a new surveillance approach was a two-fold compromise: (1) (a)
establish "a steering committee" composed of the Attorney
General, Director of National Intelligence, Secretary of
Homeland Security, and a senior or retired judicial officeholder
to exercise oversight in conjunction with the FISC and
congressional intelligence committees; (1) (b) have the NSA
report a list of warrantless surveillance targets within the previous
six months to the FISC, which in turn may object in a report to
the steering committee and congressional intelligence
committees of any "inappropriate" actions; (2) (a) allow national
security electronic surveillance sans FISA if Congress declares a
national emergency and the President certifies "that such
surveillance was necessary in the national interest"; (2) (b)
narrowly define "national security" to activities endangering the
nation; (2) (c) have a sunset period of five years if the state of
national emergency has not been lifted; (2) (d) disallow the use
of intercepted information for ordinary criminal investigations;
2(e) "require responsible officials" to certify to the FISC that no
violations had occurred in the past year; and (2) (f) bar litigation
challenging the NSA's warrantless wiretapping program. 88 Thus,
the above views of politicians, intelligence analysts, special agents,
judges, law professors, and journalists exhibit the wounds once
healed by the Cold War passage of FISA but today reopened by
the unique threats posed in the War on Terror.
85. See id. at 572-74 (enumerating objections to FISA framework).
86. Richard Posner, Op-Ed., A New Surveillance Act, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2006, at
A16 (concluding that "needle-in-a-haystack" dilemma would still exist).
87. Id. (advocating warrantless surveillance subject to "tight oversight" rather than
eased evidentiary standards).
88. Id. (surmising what a warrantless electronic surveillance statute would include).
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II. A CONTINENTAL DIVIDE
Part II shifts to the divergences in privacy perspectives,
counterterrorist approaches, and models of wiretapping in the
United States and Europe hastened by the Cold War. Some
historians and security experts have argued that historical
novitiate and intelligence structure deficiency have left the
United States dangerously unprepared and misguided to meet
the current challenge.
A. Perspectives on the Right to Privacy
The correlation between the U.S. Supreme Court's
limitations on wiretapping and its expansion of privacy rights is a
useful philosophical starting point to gauge the broader "values"
divide between the United States and its European counterparts.
James Whitman discusses the European belief that the United
States does not comprehend "the imperative demands of privacy
at all."'8 9 He touches on an important dichotomy between
dignity, which is more valued by the Europe, and liberty, which is
more treasured by the United States.90  This divergence
corresponds to the different historical experiences and cultural
modalities of the two coasts of the Atlantic, which reverberate in
both the legislative and judicial arenas.91 U.S. privacy as liberty
centers on, ironically, the British maxim that a man's home is his
castle, 92 for the design of the Fourth Amendment is to allow a
89. James Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1155-56 (2004) (recognizing the extent of the divide). But see Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003) (appreciating European values by contemplating
both liberty and dignity as notions of privacy).
90. See Whitman, supra note 89, at 1162 (outlining the derivation of the
distinction); see also Marc McAllister, Human Dignity and Individual Liberty in Germany and
the United States as Examined Through Each Country's Leading Abortion Cases, 11 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 491, 491-94 (2004) (differentiating Germany's human dignity
approach from America's individual liberty approach); Robert Post, Three Concepts of
Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2095 (2001) (contrasting theoretical conceptions of privacy as
liberty and privacy as dignity).
91. See Post, supra note 90, at 2092 (distinguishing French restrictions from U.S.
protections to enjoy bodily autonomy under the law). See generally BLANCA R. Ruiz,
PRIVACY IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: A EUROPEAN AND AN AMERICAN APPROACH (1997)
(analyzing differences between German and American privacy norms).
92. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(positing that the home warrants special protection); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court,
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man to find refuge in his own home free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.93 On the other hand, the ubiquitous
enemy of European privacy is the media, with its power to
broadcast damaging personal information.94 This incongruity in
privacy concerns between U.S. and European electronic
surveillance laws presents a deeper understanding of the
evolution of the continental divide in national security
wiretapping priorities and approaches. 95
The principles discussed in Part I undergirding the
landmark decisions of Griswold v. Connecticut,96 Katz v. United
States,97 and Roe v. Wade8 signaled the incremental nexus of
privacy as personal liberty, and, in the wake of Watergate, the
near-freedom from judicially unsupervised electronic
surveillance-underscoring the extent to which the American
historical experience during the mid- to late twentieth century
shaped wiretapping law. By contrast, what loomed most in the
European experience during the mid-twentieth century was the
searing legacy of the Second World War.99 In a comparative
analysis of U.S. and European liberty, Professor Francesca
Bignami of The George Washington University School of Law
407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (concluding that entry of a home is the "chief evil" the Fourth
Amendment addresses); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (citing the
long history of the inviolability of the home).
93. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment jealously guards the centuries-held principle of respect for the privacy of
the home); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (recognizing that the zone
of privacy for the home is plainly defined); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961) (affirming the right to be free from unreasonable governmental invasion).
94. See Whitman, supra note 89, at 1161 (underscoring the sanctity of maintaining a
person's reputation); Post, supra note 90, at 2094 (defining "privacy as dignity" as
centered on preserving integrity of one's identity and self-respect).
95. See Whitman, supra note 89, at 1162 (concluding the continental divide as a
clash of an Old World concern "not to lose public face" and a New World
preoccupation with keeping the home "as a citadel of individual sovereignty"). See
generally Post, supra note 90.
96. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
97. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
98. 410 U.S. 113 (1971).
99. See Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy
Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 609-10 (2007) (articulating Nazi
abuse of personal records of European nations is an experience unknown to the United
States). For a thorough account of the devastation and human impact of World War II
in Europe, see generallyJOHN KEEGAN, THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1990).
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conveys the formative influence of the Nazi experience on the
Europeans, noting the example of the Nazis using Norway's
government files to conscript Norwegians into the Axis army.
100
As a result, she notes, the object of European privacy law is to
prevent large-scale government efforts to marshal and potentially
manipulate information on individuals.'0 ' The breadth of the
data mining performed by the NSA is more offensive to
European privacy, for example, than a momentary wiretap in the
interest of national security.'0 2  From dissimilar historical
traumas, U.S. wiretapping concerns continue to resonate with the
deprivation of liberty resulting from the "act" of invasion, while
Europeans far less fear a fleeting intrusion than the permanent
specter of records used to compromise their personal dignity.1
0 3
B. Counterterrorist Strategy
1. The European Seriousness of Purpose in Countering
Terrorism and the Slow U.S. Response During the Cold War
Europe's seriousness of purpose in counterterrorism formed
out of the tragedy of historical experience. 4 In the mid-1970s
and early 1980s, Europe was still reeling from the embarrassment
of the terrorist plot carried out at the Munich Olympics in
1972.'I° The woeful inadequacy of the West German response to
100. See Bignami, supra note 99, at 609-10 (noting that Norwegian resistance
fighters sabotaged what would ultimately be a Nazi failed attempt); Nils Petter Gleditsch
& Nils Ivar Agoy, Norway: Toward Full Freedom of Choice?, in THE NEW CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION: FROM SACRED TO SECULAR RESISTANCE 115 (Charles C. Moskos & John
Whiteclay Chambers II eds., 1993) (stating Nazis made varying degrees of success in
conscripting Norwegians).
101. See Bignami, supra note 99, at 610 (stressing the historical trauma of World
War II as a lasting influence on European privacy law).
102. See generally Bignami, supra note 99 (discussing the controversial use of the
technique).
103. See Whitman, supra note 89, at 1162 (conveying centuries-old continental
differences in a focus on privacy guarantees); Post, supra note 88, at 2095 (providing for
theoretical understanding).
104. SeeJan Oskar Engene, Five Decades of Terrorism in Europe., The TWEED Dataset,
44J. PEACE RES. 109, 109-21 (2007) (presenting a statistical analysis of terrorism over fifty
years in eighteen European countries). For a broader historical discussion, see generally
YONAH ALEXANDER & KENNETH A. MYERS, TERRORISM IN EUROPE (1982).
105. See Alexander Wolff, When The Terror Began, TIME, Aug. 25, 2002,
http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/2002/0902/munich/ (noting official
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the hostage crisis and the bloodshed that soon ensued"°6 sparked
a new fervor in counterterrorist operations. 10 7  The West
Germans formed a special antiterrorist detachment of their
border police known as GSG-9 (Grenzschutzgruppe Neun), the
French GIGN (Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie
Nationale) handled the country's counterterrorist unit, and the
British SAS (Special Air Services Regiment) dedicated itself to
counterterrorist missions and activity."' Without the visceral
experience of terrorism at home, the United States' response was
lackluster, shrugging the example of Europe and its elite
counterterrorist units. 109 Tragedy would soon after ensue with
the failed rescue mission of the hostages held at the U.S. embassy
in Tehran. 110
The U.K. and Germany, along with France, Spain, and Italy,
faced the permanent specter of terrorist threats at home.
111
From as early as the 1960s through the 1980s, West Germany
indifference to and incompetence of counterterrorism and how much has changed); see
also SIMON REEVE, ONE DAY IN SEPTEMBER: THE FULL STORY OF THE 1972 MUNICH
OLYMPIC MASSACRE AND THE ISRAELI REVENGE OPERATION "WRATH OF GOD" 103-09
(2000) (assessing lack of German preparedness).
106. See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 72 (1998) (noting the
unpreparedness of the reaction).
107. See Ludo Block, Europe's Emerging Counter-Terrorism Elite: The ATLAS Network,
TERRORISM MONITOR, (Jamestown Found., Wash., D.C.) Mar. 15, 2007, at 10-12
(emphasizing Munich as a watershed in the proliferation of elite counterterrorist units
across Europe); Judson Knight, Germany, Counter-Terrorism Policy, Espionage
Information, http://www.espionageinfo.com/Fo-Gs/
Germany-Counter-Terrorism-Policy.hunl (last visited Mar. 28, 2009) (providing a look at
German counterterrorist conceptions).
108. See HOFFMAN, supra note 107, at 72-73 (listing changes in European approach
to counterterrorism); see also Block, supra note 107, at 10-12 (providing a look at the
functions of counterterrorist units).
109. See Bruce Hoffman, Is Europe Soft on Terrorism?, 115 FOREIGN POL'Y 62, 73
(1999) (contrasting the American "moral crusade" mindset on counterterrorism with
the more practical European approach). For further edification, see HOFFMAN, supra
note 107, at 73.
110. For an in-depth account of the Iranian Hostage Crisis, see MARK BOWDEN,
GUESTS OF THE AYATOLLAH: THE FIRST BATTLE IN AMERICA'S WAR WITH MILITANT ISLAM
(2006); see alsoJerrold D. Green, Terrorism and Politics in Iran, in TERRORISM IN CONTEXT
584 (Martha Crenshaw ed.,1995) (briefly summarizing the psychology of events leading
up to the seizure of the U.S. embassy).
111. For a history of the threats facing the countries listed above, see generally
BECKMAN, supra note 28; TERRORISM IN CONTEXT, supra note 110 (1995).
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suffered terrorist attacks from the Red Army Faction." 2  As a
result, political scientist and historian Konrad Kellen argued that
in Germany there was a "total war" effort to safeguard the home
front from terrorism, with armored limousines, special guards
and official police, and computer-based surveillance a few of the
bulwarks to help prevent attacks." 3 Similarly, the U.K. was a
frequent victim of domestic terrorism from the Irish Republican
Army since the 1960s."1 Thus, the U.K. and Germany, unlike the
United States, have battled domestic terrorism for several
decades, acquiring far-reaching experience to design their laws
to face the challenges of security. '15
The stark dichotomy between the United States and Europe
in the urgency to acquire effective counterterrorist tactics
elucidates the phenomenon of terrorism spanning continental
Europe before and after the Munich hostage crisis. 11 6 Professor
Donatella della Porta at the European University Institute
highlights that left-wing terrorism in Italy was nearly omnipresent
during all of the 1970s and part of the 1980s." 7 Not counting the
conflict in Northern Ireland, there have been more deaths in
Spain from terrorist attacks relating to ethnic conflicts than any
other Western country."' And the French colonial presence in
112. See BECKMAN, supra note 28, at 89 (mentioning effects of German terrorism);
see also Peter Merkl, West German Left-Wing Terrorism, in TERRORISM IN CONTEXT, supra
note 110, at 160, 160-210 (presenting an in-depth history and analysis of threats to West
Germany).
113. See Konrad Kellen, Ideology and Rebellion: Terrorism in West Germany, in ORIGINS
OF TERRORISM: PSYCHOLOGIES, IDEOLOGIES, THEOLOGIES, STATES OF MIND 43, 45
(Walter Reich ed., Woodrow Wilson Ctr. Press 1998) (1990) (underscoring the extent of
the German security reaction).
114. See BECKMAN, supra note 28, at 51 (noting occurrences of Irish
paramilitarism); see also Charles Townshend, The Culture of Paramilitarism in Ireland, in
TERRORISM IN CONTEXT, supra note 110, at 311, 311-51 (identifying a long history of
terrorist activities of Irish paramilitary organizations).
115. See BECKMAN, supra note 28, at 89 (noting the persistence of terrorist threats to
Europe, specifically Germany); see also Hoffman, supra note 109, at 73 (concluding that
Europe has faced enduring dangers).
116. See Engene, supra note 104, at 109-21 (presenting a statistical corroboration).
117. See Donatella della Porta, Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy, in TERRORISM IN
CONTEXT, supra note 110, 106, 106-59 (discussing the history of terrorist occurrences);
see also Richard Drake, Italy in the 1960s: A Legacy of Terrorism and Liberation, 16 S. CENT.
REV. 62, 63 (1999) (illustrating the trauma of terrorism on the Italian population).
118. See Goldie Shabad & Francisco Jose Llera Ramo, Political Violence in a
Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain, in TERRORISM IN CONTEXT, supra note 110,
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Algeria during the mid-twentieth century, which spurred a
terrorist insurgency, captured the press headlines in France.
1 1 9
Hoffman asserts that the tragedy of 9/11 did not result from
U.S. indifference to terrorism but from not becoming more
counterterrorist savvy with the internationalization of terrorism
beginning in the mid- to late twentieth century. 20 Unfortunate
yet understandable in hindsight, a U.S. preoccupation with Cold
War politics regularly relegated counterterrorism to the scrim of
the national security agenda, a rather tangential concern dwarfed
by the global chess match waged between itself and its
superpower adversary.' 2 ' Thus, the aforementioned authors and
studies have advanced the notion that the Cold War period was a
transitory moment of clarity for many European nations, which
acquired a sobriety about counterterrorism that the United States
did not in the decades prior to 9/11.122
2. U.S. Versus European Intelligence Agency Structure
The structuring of intelligence agencies is fundamental to
the use and oversight of national security wiretapping. Reflected
in the intelligence agency separation from criminal investigation,
European legal systems starkly differentiate national security
410, 410-69 (describing the history of terrorist attacks in Spain); see also William
Douglass & Joseba Zulaika, On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque
Political Process, 32 COMP. STUD. SOC'Y & HIST. 238, 238 (1990) (documenting the
number of terrorist-related deaths).
119. See Martha Crenshaw, The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War, in
TERRORISM IN CONTEXT, supra note 110, 473, 473-513 (providing historical perspective
and analysis). See generally Jeremy Shapiro & Benedicte Suzan, The French Experience of
Counter-terrorism, SURVIVAL, Spring 2003, at 67 (outlining the French history of terrorism
and counterterrorism over the last twenty years).
120. See Hoffman, supra note 109, at 68-72 (explaining that the American hard-line
stance on international terrorism during the Cold War differed from the European
focus on internal terrorism, the result of which was Europe developing more
counterterrorist sensibilities to protect the home front from indigenous threats).
121. See HOFFMAN, supra note 107, at 73 (highlighting counterterrorism's backseat
during the Cold War). For a look at the diversionary extremes of preoccupation with
communist infiltration in America, see ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES:
MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA (1998).
122. See HOFFMAN, supra note 107, at 72-73 (contrasting European seriousness
about terrorism with American unresponsiveness); see also THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 12, at 71-107 (chronicling the history and institutional failings of
American counterterrorism since the Cold War).
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from run-of-the-mill criminal inquiries.123 A further bifurcation is
visible in the intelligence agency set-up, with one agency
gathering intelligence on potential threats from foreign powers,
and the other focusing on the threats at home, whether foreign-
sponsored or home-grown.124 The two agencies do not warrant
as much scrutiny as the police, with oversight exercised by either
the executive or legislative branch, not the judiciary.'25 On the
contrary, in the United States, the foreign intelligence agencies-
the CIA for human intelligence and the NSA for signals
intelligence-do not have domestic equivalents.' 26  The FBI
controls both criminal investigation and domestic intelligence
operations, with more investigations devoted to criminal police
work than national security protection.
127
The structure of the German intelligence community
includes the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), devoted to
collecting intelligence outside of Germany; the Office for the
Protection of the Constitution (BFV), providing for intelligence
operations within Germany; and the Military Counterintelligence
Branch (MAD), restricted to military counterespionage and
internal security within the armed forces. 28  Oversight of the
123. See BIGNAMI, supra note 99, at 621 (defining hidebound distinction of
European national security and criminal law); see also RICHARD POSNER, COUNTERING
TERRORISM: BLURRED FOCUS, HALTING STEPS 171-202 (2007) (arguing that the criminal
justice system is the wrong venue for countering terrorism).
124. See Bignami, supra note 99, at 621 (noting the defined roles of European
intelligence agencies); see also POSNER, supra note 30, 164-97 (evaluating European
approaches to intelligence analysis and structure).
125. See Bignami, supra note 99, at 622 (stating the general trend in Europe); see
also POSNER, supra note 123, at 171-202 (discussing 'judicialization" of counterterrorism
in U.S.).
126. See Bignami, supra note 99, at 622-23 (stating the functions of the two U.S.
intelligence agencies); see also POSNER, supra note 123, at 33-69 (expressing concern with
the current division of functions in the United States).
127. See Bignami, supra note 99, at 622-23 (citing realities of the division of labor
for the FBI); see also POSNER, supra note 123, at 33-69 (arguing that the U.S. merger of
criminal and national security pursuits yields a glaring deficiency in U.S. approach to
counterterrorism).
128. See Shlomo Shpiro, Parliament, Media and the Control of Intelligence Services in
Germany, in DEMOCRACY, LAW AND SECURITY: INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES IN
CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 294, 295-96 (Jean-Paul Brodeur et al. ed., 2003) [hereinafter
Shpiro, Parliament, Media & Control of Intelligence Servs. in F.R.G.] (presenting an
exclusive focus on Germany); Shlomo Shpiro, Parliamentary and Administrative Reforms in
the Control of Intelligence Services in the European Union, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 545, 550
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intelligence community rests with an elaborate parliamentary
system comprising four distinct parliamentary bodies with
circumscribed powers, as detailed below.129 Professor Shlomo
Shpiro of Bar-Ilan University adds that sometimes overlooked is
the supplementing role of the media in monitoring intelligence
activities. 3 ' He concludes that parliamentary committees, along
with the media, effectively keep close watch. 31
In the U.K., the Security Service ("MI-5") and the Secret
Intelligence Service (SIS or "MI-6") are sharply defined, dual-
headed intelligence agencies.' 32 MI-5 is primarily responsible for
protecting the U.K. against national security dangers, while MI-6
gathers secret foreign intelligence, which MI-5 can use to protect
the homeland. 133 MI-5 and MI-6 are subject to various forms of
oversight, as detailed below.'34 Although MI-5 and MI-6 are
rough equivalents to the FBI and CIA, respectively, Judge
Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit is an outspoken critic of the incongruous missions of the
FBI and MI-5.' 35 The U.S. approach to counterterrorism, he
(1998) [hereinafter Shpiro, Parliamentary & Admin. Reforms in Control of Intelligence Servs.
in EU] (discussing German intelligence in the context of other European nations).
129. See Shpiro, Parliament, Media & Control of Intelligence Servs. in FR. G., supra note
128, at 296-97; Shpiro, Parliamentary & Admin. Reforms in Control of Intelligence Servs. in
EU, supra note 128, at 554-63 (delineating how oversight structure operates); infra notes
160-63 and accompanying text.
130. See Shpiro, Parliament, Media & Control ofIntelligence Servs. in FR. G., supra note
128, at 305-08; Shpiro, Parliamentary & Admin. Reforms in Control of Intelligence Servs. in
EU, supra note 128, at 575 (discussing the role of the media).
131. See Shpiro, Parliament, Media & Control of Intelligence Servs. in F.R. G., supra note
128, at 311; Shpiro, Parliamentary & Admin. Reforms in Control of Intelligence Sers. in EU,
supra note 128, at 559-60 (claiming smooth functioning relationship between oversight
bodies and intelligence services).
132. See BECKMAN, supra note 28, at 56 (detailing process of intelligence gathering
in Britain); see also Peter Gill, Security and Intelligence Services in the UK, in DEMOCRACY,
LAW AND SECURITY: INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 265, 267
(2003) (detailing functions of MI-5 and MI-6).
133. See Gill, supra note 132, at 267, 270-71 (underlining the evolution of the
approach); see also POSNER, supra note 30, at 166-67 (summarizing similar intelligence
setup in other western countries).
134. See infra notes 173-178 and accompanying text.
135. See Richard Posner, Op-Ed., Time to Rethink the FBI, WALL ST.J., Mar. 19, 2007,
A13 (declaring that the FBI is "incapable of effective counterterrorism" and should
more resemble Britain's MI-5); see also Al Johnson, Rethinking the FBI?, AMERICAN
THINKER, Apr. 5, 2007,
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argues, must transition from an FBI criminal mindset-arrest,
conviction, and sentencing-to the British outlook of prevention
as its guiding philosophy.136 He concludes that, unlike the
United States, there is an exclusivity of focus and supremacy of
integration and coordination in the intelligence services of the
U.K. and other Western nations to secure the home front from
terrorist attacks. 137
The 9/11 Commission Report, of incalculable import in
uncovering the unresponsiveness of the U.S. government to the
threat of terrorism since World War II, prescribed a unification
of intelligence agencies to improve communications among
them, a recommendation which the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act ("Intelligence Reform Act" or "IRA")
of 2004 codified. 138  Such a response is a natural one, as the
uncooperative posture of the FBI, CIA, and other intelligence
agencies surely did not help to prevent the attacks of 9/11.139
The question remains, however, will a bureaucratic umbrella
provide the panacea to a massive intelligence breakdown, or
produce a similar failure?14 According to Professor Anne
O'Connell of the University of California, Berkeley School of
Law, the optimal answer did not lie in the restructuring of the
http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/04/rethinkingthe-tbi.html (summarizing and
analyzing Posner's views on the FBI).
136. See Posner, supra note 135 (indicating that, in the realm of terrorism,
punishment is a poor substitute for prevention); see also POSNER, supra note 123, at 138
(criticizing the new National Security Branch of the FBI for its continued focus on
arrests).
137. See Posner, supra note 135 (wittily suggesting that the FBI has the wrong set of
teeth for counterterrorism); see also POSNER, supra note 123, at 155-56 (citing successes
of the U.K. Security Service ("MI-5") as a model for United States to embrace).
138. See Intellignece Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458 (2004); THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 12, at 364; POSNER, supra
note 30, at 2 (indicating report laid "factual and analytical foundations" of the
Intelligence Reform Act).
139. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 12, at 78-79 (discussing lack of
communication); see also POSNER, supra note 30, at 153 (specifying intraagency strains
are sometimes more present than inter-agency tensions).
140. See POSNER, supra note 30, at 5-6 (bemoaning the success of the 9/11
Commission, from squelching vigorous debate and dissent to its preconceived biases and
flawed recommendations for intelligence restructuring). See generally Gorman, supra
note 11, at 353 (arguing new agencies and increased bureaucracy muddy "lines of
responsibility").
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Intelligence Reform Act.14 1 O'Connell points out that the 9/11
Commission Report stressed more unification and less
redundancy in the intelligence community, but counters that
redundancy can be beneficial because it diminishes the chance
of a complete system breakdown. 142  Arguing that optimal
intelligence restructuring in the U.S. context must embrace both
unity and redundancy, she concludes that a mixed blend of
cooperation and competition provides for more net benefits in a
federal system built on such tensions.143  It is unlikely that a
sizeable country such as the United States, with a federal system
that is inherently decentralized, can ever mirror the
nonoverlapping intelligence agencies of Europe, nor should it so
desire. 144
3. Europe: Wiretapping Without the Oversight of the Courts
The need for judicial oversight of national security
wiretapping in the U.K. and West Germany became the subject of
litigation in late 1970s and early 1980s. 145 Invoking the European
Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"), German and British
citizens challenged their respective countries' wiretapping
practices as violative of the principles underlying agreed-upon
141. See Anne J. O'Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1675 (2006) (arguing that
this approach is too simplistic and does not account for needed nuance); see also
POSNER, supra note 30, at 9 (analogizing the restructuring of the intelligence community
to an "organizational nightmare").
142. See O'Connell, supra note 141, at 1675, 1678 (advocating for an economics
perspective on the virtue of competition to understand the optimal solution); see also
POSNER, supra note 30, at 148-49 (reasoning intelligence community needs redundancy
as a "standard method of increasing safety").
143. See O'Connell, supra note 141, at 1675-76 (envisioning a mathematical prism
in which to view the nature of the dilemma); see also POSNER, supra note 30, at 157-58
(elucidating the weaknesses of centralization and "pluralism" and recognizing that there
is "no known organizational form" as a cure-all for dysfunction in intelligence gathering
and sharing).
144. See O'Connell, supra note 141, at 1675, 1685 (injecting a dose of realism into
the debate); see also POSNER, supra note 30, at 144 (reasoning that "size and
heterogeneity" restrict an "optimal degree of centralization").
145. See Karen C. Burke, Secret Surveillance and the European Convention on Human
Rights, 33 STAN. L. REv. 1113, 1117 (1981) (analyzing the outcome of wiretapping cases);
see alsoJames G. Carr, Wiretapping in West Germany, 29 AM.J. COMP. L. 607, 612 (1981)
(discussing the subject of wiretapping litigation).
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European international law.'46 In the landmark decision Klass,
the European Court of Human Rights ("European Court")
upheld the national power of the German government to wiretap
without judicial approval for the purposes of national security. 147
This decision was a watershed with broader ramifications for the
courts of the U.K. and other European nations to gauge. 148
a. Germany
In 1968, West Germany adopted amendments to Article 10
of the Basic Law that enabled the federal government to evade
the courts and permit surveillance of mail and
telecommunications when national security interests were at
stake."' Klass held that the new G-10 legislation did not violate
the freedoms and rights established by Article 8 of the ECHR for
checking executive wiretapping powers. 150  To order such
surveillance there must first be a "written application giving
reasons," with a Federal Minister or head of a federal state
required to consult with the parliament-appointed G-10
Commission-save emergency situations but as soon as possible
thereafter. 15 1  To the dismay of Author Karen Burke, the
European Court, in her view, did not adequately gauge the
ramifications of substituting parliamentary for judicial oversight
of wiretapping.'52 As lain Cameron writes, however, the G-10 law
was "designed to be preventative in nature," deeming the lower
146. See Burke, supra note 145, at 1116, 1123 (discussing the landmark British and
German cases).
147. See Case of Klass, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978); see also Burke, supra note
145, at 1117-18 (analyzing the holding of Klass).
148. See Burke, supra note 145, at 1123 (noting the importance of the decision).
149. Gesetz zur Beschrankung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses [Law
Restricting Letters, Post, and Telecommunications Secrecy] (Gesetz zu Artikel
Grundgesetz), Aug. 13, 1968 BGBI. 1 at 949 [hereinafter G-10]; see also BECKMAN, supra
note 28, at 94.
150. See Klass, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 28 (justifying G-10 legislation "as being
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security"); see also Burke,
supra note 145, at 1114.
151. G-10, art. 4, 1 9(3) (requiring application "must be substantiated."); see also
Klass, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24 (noting satisfaction that "there exists an
administrative procedure designed to ensure that measures are not ordered
haphazardly, irregularly or without due and proper consideration").
152. See Burke, supra note 145, at 1115 (contending that such substitution is not
sufficient).
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standard of "actual indications" rather than "probable cause" or
"reasonable grounds for belief" a more appropriate evidentiary
benchmark for a non-judicial process. 153  "Actual indications"
means that a particular offense against national security has
been, is being, or is planned to be undertaken, with surveillance
confined to the suspects and individuals with whom they are in
contact. 154  According to the European Court, because the
structuring of the G-10 law did not permit "exploratory or
general surveillance," but limited the scope of the wiretapping
probe to the mere "factual indications" of the planning stages
and beyond of a crime against national security, standard judicial
tests such as probable cause were inapplicable and
unnecessary. 15
5
The European Court found an adequate safeguard in the
extrajudicial G-10 Commission, a quasi-legislative court, with a
chairman qualified to hold judicial office, and two other
members who did not have to be formally trained in the law,
entrusted with supervisory responsibilities to oversee executive
wiretapping activities. 5 6  With the G-10 Commission not
adopting judicial procedures and the legislative branch
exercising considerable political influence, Burke believed that
the G-10 Commission did not adequately assure impartiality and
independence.157 The European Court, however, in a careful
153. See lAIN CAMERON, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 110 (2000) (discussing the incompatibility between rigorous legal
standards and national security objectives).
154. G-10, art. 2, 3(1)-(2) (including membership in "association whose
purpose or activity" is "offenses against the basic liberal democratic order."); see also
Klass, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24 (accentuating that "measures may only be ordered if
the establishment of the facts by another method is without prospects of success or
considerably more difficult" (emphasis added)).
155. See Klass, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24 (outlining "series of limitative
conditions" that ensure proper protocol); Burke, supra note 145, at 1120 (noting
'judges were deemed incompetent to administer an authorization standard based on
pure fact-finding").
156. See Klass, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (concluding G-10 Board and C-10
Commission were "independent of the authorities carrying out the surveillance" and
"vested with sufficient powers and competence to exercise an effective and continuous
control"); Burke, supra note 145, at 1120 (quoting argument that "political questions
must be decided by politicians").
157. See Burke, supra note 145, at 1120 (using "doubtful" to describe "impartiality
and independence" of G-10 Commission); see also Carr, supra note 145, at 609
(emphasizing non-judicial presence with respect to national security wiretapping).
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assessment of "all the circumstances of the case," including "the
nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, the grounds
required for ordering such measures, the authorities competent
to permit, carry out and supervise such measures, and the kind of
remedy provided by the national law," found the law and its
system of oversight not to be violative of Article 8 of the
Convention. 58 The court concluded "that the exclusion of
judicial control does not exceed the limits of what may be
deemed necessary in a democratic society."159
In Germany, some civil libertarians still assert that people
under national security surveillance cannot effectively
remonstrate against violations of privacy, left with only the hope
that a supervisory body of or closely aligned to Parliament will
objectively look at their case.160 German law nonetheless requires
that the G-10 Board, a parliamentary committee meeting every
six months that consists of nine members of Parliament
proportionally selected by party affiliation, exercise general
supervision over the electronic surveillance activities of the
government. 161  In addition, the aforementioned G-10
Commission, which is now made up of four deputies who are not
members of Parliament but are politically affiliated, guarantees
an individual analysis of each case, with the authority to either
suspend or curtail national security wiretapping operations if
contrary to law.' 62 As a result, a nonjudicial check is the bulwark
158. Klass, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (declaring that "[the] Court must be
satisfied" of "exist[ing] adequate and effective guarantees against abuse" under the "all
the circumstances" test).
159. Id. at 26 (celebrating the "democratic character" of the oversight system).
160. See BECKMAN, supra note 28, at 105; see also Hoffman, supra note 109, at 72
(mentioning civil rights activists' fear of governments trampling on fundamental rights
in Europe in the name of security).
161. G-10, art. 5, 14. For further clarification, see BECKMAN, supra note 28, at
105; CAMERON, supra note 153, at 127.
162. G-10 art. 5, 15; see Klass, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (noting review of
surveillance can begin when first ordered, in the course of surveillance, or after its
termination); Shpiro, Parliamentary & Admin. Reforms in Control of Intelligence Serus. in EU
at 558. But see G-10, art. 4, 12; CAMERON, supra note 153, at 142 (stating that
notification to individuals under surveillance is impermissible when "jeopardizing
continuing intelligence operations."). Cameron states, however, that "it can be argued
that all notifications damage continuing operations." Id. Non-notification naturally
stymies the pursuit of remedies available to an individual subject to unlawful national
security surveillance.
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against excesses of wiretapping, with the German system evincing
a clarity of executive power and legislative oversight in the arena
of national security. 163
b. United Kingdom
In 1979, the legality of British wiretapping practices was
under challenge for the first time in Malone v. Metropolitan Police
Commissioner."6  Conventional executive practice necessitated a
warrant from the Secretary of State to approve wiretapping, but
the English court found it was not a legal requirement. 165  The
court concluded that telephone tapping was an issue for
Parliament to weigh, not the courts. 16 6  Although Malone was
critical of unregulated executive power, the government's lone
concession was the selection of a judicial monitor who did not
have the power to discontinue the practice, or to inform
Parliament.' 67  The European Court, however, in Malone, ruled
that British wiretapping rules indeed violated Article 8 of the
ECHR. 168  The court held that to allow the executive legal
discretion "expressed in terms of an unfettered power" was
contrary to the rule of law.169
The 1984 decision prompted the 1985 enactment of the
Interception of Communications Act ("IOCA"), in which the
British Parliament promulgated specific rules for national
security surveillance, codifying the role of the Home Secretary of
State as dispenser of warrants.17 ° James Beckman notes that the
Act received criticism for not providing adequate safeguards
163. See Klass, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (touting "sufficient independence" of
executive authorities and legislative overseers); BECKMAN, supra note 28, at 94, 105.
164. See [1979] Ch. 344; Burke, supra note 145, at 1123.
165. See Malone, [1979] Ch. at 369. (reasoning that telephone tapping "involves no
act of trespass"); Burke, supra note 145, at 1124.
166. See Malone, [1979] Ch. at 346.
167. See Burke, supra note 145, at 1127-28 (arguing that "[a] weak judicial monitor
does not cure the inadequacy of the safeguards against abuse").
168. 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984).
169. Id. at 33 (1984) ("[T]he law must indicate the scope of any such discretion
conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient
clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the
individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference.").
170. Interception of Communications Act, 1985, c. 56 (U.K.); see BECKMAN, supra
note 28, at 58.
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against civil liberties abuses because it did not delineate
intelligible standards for issuing a warrant and empowered an
executive branch official to authorize intercepts-in other words,
the executive branch effectively remained its own arbiter of
propriety. 7 ' The 2000 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
("RIPA") repealed the IOCA, with the RIPA guidelines for an
interception warrant stipulating that the Secretary of State not
issue a warrant unless it is "necessary" to the interests of national
security and "the conduct authorized by the warrant is
proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that
conduct."1 7
2
MI-5 and MI-6 are subject to ministerial, parliamentary, and
judicial review in cases of improper electronic surveillance.'73
The RIPA replaced the IOCA Commissioner with the
Interception of Communications Commissioner ("ICC") and
supplanted the commissioners under the 1989 Security Service
Act ("SSA") and the 1994 Intelligence Services Act ("ISA") with
the Intelligence Services Commissioner ("ISC"). 17 4  The Prime
Minister appoints the ICC and the ISC to review warrant
applications and report any abuses back to him.'75  An
independent Investigatory Powers Tribunal, superseding and
combining the tribunals of the IOCA, SSA, and ISA, considers
individual complaints. 7 6 The Investigatory Powers Tribunal has
171. See BECKMAN, supra note 28, at 58 (relaying conventional arguments of too
much executive power).
172. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23, § 5(2) (a)-(3) (a) (U.K.).
173. See id.; Intelligence Services Act, 1994, c. 13 (U.K.); Security Service Act, 1989,
c. 5 (U.K.); BECKMAN, supra note 28, at 58; MI-5, Oversight, http://www.mi5.gov.uk/
output/oversight.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2009); The Parliamentary, Ministerial,
Judicial and Financial Oversight of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS),
http://www.mi6.gov.uk/output/legislation-and-accountability.html (last visited Sept. 28,
2009).
174. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act §§ 57, 59. The Interception of
Communications Commissioner ("ICC") and the Intelligence Services Commissioner
("ISC") must hold or have held "a high judicial office." Id. §§ 57(5), 59(5). See generally
MI-6, Judicial Oversight, http://www.sis.gov.uk/output/judicial-oversight.html (last
visited Sept. 28, 2009) (the ICC "examines the statutory conduct of the interception of
communications by the agencies," and the ISC "looks at the statutory conduct of human
and technical operations.").
175. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act §§ 58, 60 (the reports should be
annual).
176. Id. § 65. The tribunal currently has seven members. The President and Vice
President must hold or have held high judicial office; the other members must be senior
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"the power to make any such award of compensation or other
order as they think fit" and to "order quashing or cancelling any
warrant or authorisation."177 Although the ICC and ISC
Commissioners are senior judges, leaving the operations of MI-5
and MI-6 largely beyond the discretion of the courts insulates
serious crimes against the state, such as terrorism and espionage,
from the scrutiny deserving of more ordinary criminal
investigations. 178 Thus, Part II reveals that, during the Cold War
and beyond, the judiciary lurked in the distant shadows of British
and German national security wiretapping oversight.
III. THE WRONG RESPONSE AND HOW THE RIGHT ONE
STAYS TRUE TO OUR SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
In a post-9/11 world, intelligence agency operations
unimpeded by excessive judicial review position the U.K. and
Germany as better equipped for counterterrorism than the FISA-
burdened United States. 179 The European intelligence structure
and its appropriate oversight, which, since the Cold War, helped
to extirpate indigenous terrorist cells, suit today's task of
defeating the threat of Islamic-extremist terrorists.8 0 The United
States, on the other hand, although watchful of communist
subversion during the Cold War, never had to concentrate
exclusively on terrorism at home in the way Europe had.181 Part
III emphasizes that the noble, but often misguided, post-9/11
remedies set forth by the U.S. federal government prolong the
members of the legal profession. See Investigatory Powers Tribunal, Structure of the
Tribunal, http://www.ipt-uk.com/default.asp?sectionlD=7 (last visited Mar. 28, 2009).
177. See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act § 67(7). See also The Investigatory
Powers Tribunal, FAQs, http://www.ipt-uk.com/default.asp?sectionlD=FAQ&Q=3 (last
visited Mar. 28, 2009) ("If [the applicant's] complaint is upheld, the Tribunal may
decide to disclose details of any conduct. If [the applicant's] complaint is not upheld,
[the applicant] will not be told if any conduct has been taken against [him or her] or
not." (emphasis added)).
178. See Gill, supra note 132, at 271 (showing a statistical breakdown of MI-5's
priorities).
179. See supra notes 51-88, 117-71 and accompanying text (emphasizing that
judicial cumbersomeness hinders speed and capacity of anti-terrorist response).
180. See supra notes 104-22 and accompanying text (arguing that an antiterrorism
focus and tactics during the Cold War prepared Europe for the current War on Terror).
181. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (noting that the U.S. historical
evolution did not make counterterrorism a high priority).
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lingering institutional and procedural inadequacies of U.S.
intelligence agencies to prevent terrorist attacks on its soil."8 2
First, the similar standards of review applied to criminal
enforcement and national security best exemplify the continued
blurring of what should be a sharp distinction.8 3  Second,
oversight of national security wiretapping is, as the U.K. and
Germany demonstrate, an out-of-place function for the
judiciary.8 4 In accordance with the Constitution, the political
branches of government should decide which national security
wiretapping probes are necessary when collecting foreign
intelligence.18 5
A. The Post-9/11 Approach
One must first ask whether the breakdown of
communication leading up to 9/11 resulted from more than
mere intelligence infighting and disunity, but rather from the
glaringly soft distinction between national security and criminal
law stifling U.S. intelligence gathering efforts.8 6 FISA's tragic
misreading and accompanying misapplications of the probable
cause threshold revealed an outmoded, overjudicial approach
that should have been more accommodating and adaptable to
War on Terror oversight.8 7 Germany's "actual indications" or
the U.K.'s "necessary" and "proportionate" standards are more
appropriate for facing the twenty-first-century threats of irrational
terrorist actors armed by their state sponsors with the potential to
182. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text (identifying the importance of
intelligence structuring in prosecuting the War on Terror).
183. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (contending that the potential
for misconstruing probable cause threshold in FISA and criminal contexts still exists).
184. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (arguing for the constitutionality
of and wisdom in monitoring national security wiretapping outside of the judicial
framework).
185. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (emphasizing the clear
constitutional delegation of national security and foreign affairs responsibilities to the
President and Congress).
186. See supra notes 64-66, 76-82 and accompanying text (underscoring the depth
of intelligence agency dysfunction beyond mere turf wars).
187. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (recognizing the inadequacy of
the probable cause threshold for the exigencies of fighting the War on Terror).
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detonate biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons.'88 Adopting
these clear, less demanding evidentiary burdens will forestall
continued misinterpretations of seemingly similar standards in
the national security and criminal contexts. The "FISA wall"
evinced the fear of intelligence agencies' becoming forced to
abide by the strict standards of the criminal justice system, so
much so that they did not work with criminal investigators.
8 9
The linguistic somersaults of the USA PATRIOT Act and the
more recent Protect America Act of 2007190 and FISA
Amendments Act of 2008'9' will not be sufficient in the long term
to assuage such fears. 9 2 To tear down the "FISA wall," "walls"
demarcating evidentiary standards branch oversight must rise to
sharply distinguish criminal and foreign-intelligence national
security wiretapping, instead of more bureaucratic IRA
penumbras. Clarity cannot exist under FISA, but oversight
modeled, in part, on the British and German approaches will
calm intelligence agencies to work in concert with criminal
investigators.
B. Fulfilling the U.S. Constitution
The Keith Court's ruling that judicial oversight and a Fourth
Amendment determination of probable cause are required for
purely domestic national security wiretapping probes extends no
further. 3 With the constitutionality of FISA still undecided by
the Court, the Keith decision's explicit distinction between purely
domestic and foreign-related national security wiretapping
implies limits to the latter's evidentiary obligations under the
Fourth Amendment and the scope of the judiciary in its oversight
188. See supra notes 153-55, 172 and accompanying text (documenting relaxed
evidentiary thresholds for British and German national security wiretapping models).
189. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (highlighting the extent to which
evidentiary misinterpretation stunted cooperation of intelligence and criminal
operatives).
190. Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007).
191. Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008).
192. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (describing recent and current
remedies to facilitating intelligence gathering and sharing).
193. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining the distinction between
purely domestic national security wiretapping and its foreign counterpart).
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under the doctrine of separation of powers.194 The Court's
search in Keith for an "independent check upon executive
discretion" ended with the judicial safeguards contemplated by
the Fourth Amendment for purely domestic national security
wiretapping-the domestic component of which may indeed
present criminal law concerns best suited for judicial scrutiny.' 95
In the matter of foreign-intelligence national security
wiretapping, the people's chambers of Article I-elected to
engage foreign policy and "provide for the common Defense and
general Welfare of the United States"-best check the executive
as urged in Keith, not the courts of Article III.196
This Note proposes what a post-FISA framework should
resemble. Similar to Germany, select intelligence committees in
each chamber of Congress should exercise general oversight of
foreign intelligence national security wiretapping, while a
"secret" commission or tribunal under the aegis of the
committees, vested with the power to grant or deny applications
by federal officers and discontinue illegal probes, should review
individual cases.197 Similar to the U.K., the President of the
United States should appoint an Interception of
Communications Commissioner-a judge or retired judge of
high esteem-to draft annual reports to him and Congress on
the commission's competence and adherence to the law and to
make such reports available to the public. The commission
should apply a two-pronged time-saving and easily understood
non-judicial determination in review: first, whether there are
actual indications or reasonable bases to believe the target is a
foreign power or agent of a foreign power that poses a statutorily
194. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (noting that the Keith Court
distinguished the power of the President in the context of foreign affairs and was not
prepared to extend its holding to that realm).
195. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discerning concerns of the Court in
both preserving civil liberties and protecting imperatives of national security).
196. See supra notes 23-26, 42 and accompanying text (articulating the role of
Congress in national security considerations).
197. See supra note 161-62 and accompanying text (detailing the parliamentary
oversight system of German national security wiretapping). This Note would prefer a
commission of similar size-three to five members-to its German counterpart. The
members need not possess formal legal training, although such a background should
not act as a disqualification. A background in intelligence would be preferable, but such
members should be completely independent of any intelligence agencies.
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defined national security threat; and second, whether the
executive branch's probe was necessary for, and proportionate
to, the expressed aims of the surveillance undertaken in the
interests of national security. 198 Notwithstanding any statutorily
recognized exceptions for exigent circumstances, if either of
these two prongs will be, are being, or have been violated in any
individual case, then FISA-modeled criminal sanctions and civil
liability should be available to the victim to pursue before the
commission or in a court of law.199 The issue of providing notice
to the individuals placed under unlawful electronic surveillance
continues to present a quandary, as all three wiretapping systems
discussed herein have limited disclosure for fear of
compromising national security methods."' This Note concludes
that such a balancing act, although imperfect, is necessary, for
any blanket disclosure or nondisclosure provisions will sacrifice
security for liberty or vice versa.
This Note's solution disagrees with the above-outlined
approach advanced by Judge Posner for four reasons: (1) three
of the four members of the proposed steering committee would
not be independent of the President, with too much oversight
power vested in the executive branch; (2) contrary to Posner's
wariness, the U.K. and Germany demonstrate that lower
evidentiary standards can be applied, in their cases, to all forms
of national security wiretapping, albeit outside of the court
context, and still properly conform to the demands of a
democratic society; (3) oversight would not be the primary
constitutional function of Congress but a shared responsibility
with the two other branches, for Posner makes the FISC and the
steering committee important overseers; and (4) the declaration
of a national emergency should not be necessary to operate
without judicial oversight, for a foreign-sponsored national
198. See supra notes 70, 153-55, 172 and accompanying text (discussing non-
probable cause determinations used in national security wiretapping contexts).
199. See supra notes 162, 177 and accompanying text (noting compensation is also
available to British and Germans victims of wrongful wiretapping intrusions).
200. See supra notes 62, 162, 177 and accompanying text (reminding that
government must be careful to protect intelligence gathering operations from enemy
advantage).
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security threat is at any time an inherent national security
concern for Congress to monitor, not the courts.2 °t
As in Germany and the U.K., these standards should be
applied flexibly but strictly enforced so Nixon-like enemy lists
used to purge political foes remain a remembrance, and that
criminal investigators cannot stealthily bypass the more stringent
criminal law rules of evidence.20 2 The true motivation behind the
Church Commission hearings and its byproduct FISA was not
necessarily to entrust the judiciary in perpetuity with national
security wiretapping, but to curb the abuses of government
officials and confront a growing imperial presidency at the
time. 213 Under the original scheme of separation of powers, the
branch of government overseeing U.S. national security and
foreign affairs by order of the Constitution is Congress. 0 4 This
Note hopes that reaffirming the role of Congress as national
security overseer will encourage hands-on activeness of legislative
officials to protect this country in a way not seen since the Cold
War ended.
John Yoo is correct that FISA is an inappropriate Article III
device that hamstrings the power of the executive branch, but
the President alone should not have unrestricted authority.20 5
The naked attempt of President Bush's administration to bypass
both Congress and the courts sets a dangerous precedent.2 6 The
Framers did not countenance the Unitary Executive Theory, for
it is a violation of the separation of powers upon which the
longevity of the U.S. republic rests. 27 The Supreme Court has
expressly rejected the syllogistic logic that Yoo adopts from
201. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (enumerating Posner's solutions
to amending current FISA-exclusive approach).
202. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (warning of dangers of criminal
investigations circumventing safeguards of criminal wiretapping law).
203. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (remarking on abuses leading to
formation of Church Committee and passage of FISA).
204. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (noting congressional national
security functions and oversight responsibilities).
205. See supra notes 18, 20 and accompanying text (presenting arguments for
unchecked presidential power in protecting country from foreign-sponsored national
security threats).
206. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing President's syllogistic
logic to expand his power as commander-in-chief).
207. See supra notes 23, 25 and accompanying text (blanketing separation of powers
prohibits foundations upon which Unitary Executive Theory rests).
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President Harry Truman's Unitary Executive Theory argument in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure).2 8  The
Constitution delegates powers of national security to both
Congress and the President, with the most weighted
responsibility--declaring war-reserved for Congress. 20 9  The
body of case law to emerge from the Supreme Court mirrors this
Note's proposition that Congress must pursue its enumerated
responsibilities in protecting both national security and civil
liberties. 210
Yoo raises some important points in support of TSP. This
Note, however, finds his choice of case law and historical analogy
troubling. He invokes the memorable but constitutionally hazy
line from United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. that the President is
the "sole organ" of the country in foreign relations. 211  The
flawed logic of this decision should not form the basis for a more
expansive power base of the President.212 Yoo also makes the
case that President Bush's prosecution of the War on Terror is
akin to that of prior presidents during wartime, furnishing the
examples of Abraham Lincoln's Civil War and FDR's World War
11.213 But such wars, for which warfare was conventional and an
end was in sight, are not comparable to the current challenge.
214
Additionally, listing the uses and defenses of warrantless
wiretapping probes from FDR to Bill Clinton may be of
persuasive importance, but historical practice is not dispositive of
constitutionality.215 For Yoo to use history as an argument to not
208. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (noting formative impact of
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. in disputing the Curtiss-Wright notion of unitary Executive).
209. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (underscoring weight of
responsibility founders placed on Congress in protecting country).
210. See supra notes 22-23, 25-26 and accompanying text (listing court cases reining
in claimed incidental wartime powers of President).
211. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (noting rejection of Curtiss-Wright in
subsequent Court decisions).
212. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (presenting later Court cases
disputing Court's assertion of presidential exclusivity in foreign affairs).
213. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (emphasizing that War on Terror is a
new kind of war unparalleled in U.S. history).
214. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting uniqueness of current
period in American foreign policy and national security).
215. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (recurrence of executive action is
not an adequate justification for constitutionality).
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exercise any outside oversight of executive wiretapping is ironic,
for it is a history of abuse which beckons for oversight.21 6
Yoo's analysis focuses on Congress' failings in wartime
leadership, as if the executive branch has not led, or more
appropriate to say, misled the U.S. into war and then proceeded
to bungle the war effort: Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq, to name a
few.217 He argues that the executive branch is far more capable
to pursue the war against Al-Qaeda than its legislative
counterpart, with which this author does not disagree.218 As the
Court professed in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, however, "a state of war is
not a blank check" for the President when the rights of the
country's citizens are at stake.2 19 An executive with complete and
unfettered discretion to wiretap, even for national security
purposes, betrays the original intent of the framers and the
continued jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.22  As a
compromise between well-meaning advocates on both sides,
Congress should occupy the middle ground between the ends of
judicial oversight and executive freehand.22'
Critics of this analysis may claim: (1) FISA is not a
hindrance to the pursuit of terrorist activities, which the statistics
facially evidence; and (2) bypassing judicial oversight violates our
civil liberties and corrodes the U.S. constitutional republic and
the separation of powers on which it rests. First, the statistics,
which superficially signify nonintervention, are not dispositive.222
The hampering effects of judicial oversight, as documented
earlier by the burdensome criminal justice-like standards of
evidence and review, deter intelligence agencies from not only
216. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (detailing background of Church
hearings into abuses of intelligence gathering).
217. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (presenting blemished record of
Presidents during Cold War and War on Terror in prosecuting military conflicts).
218. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (it is logical to assume that the
branch entrusted with execution would be more effective in the prosecution of war).
219. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (noting Presidents have frequently
ignored such warnings since then).
220. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (chronicling settled history and
re-emergent concerns on bounds of executive power).
221. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (arguing for more proactive
approach of Congress on matters of national security and foreign affairs).
222. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (statistics do not include the
missed opportunities of preliminary analyses).
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keeping a more constant and roving watch on terrorist activities,
but from looking in harder places to find in order to conserve
limited resources.223  Second, and most important, the
termination of FISA would in no way diminish the solemn
reminder of the exceptionalism for which the United States must
strive and exemplify.22 4 This Note has neither advocated nor
suggested the employment of extra-constitutional actions to
prosecute the War on Terror; in fact, congressional oversight, not
judicial review, of national security actions strengthens the
Constitution.225 Workable evidentiary standards and
appropriately placed oversight are not anathema to the
democratic experiment, as the German and British balancing of
liberty and security so attest.
CONCLUSION
Authors James Nathan and James Oliver argue that the
anxiety of U.S. democracy during the Cold War centered on
three elements: the constitutional and institutional strains
between Congress and the President; the materialization of a
national security bureaucracy after the Second World War; and
the significance of U.S. public opinion. 62 2  These concerns ring
just as true today, but the challenges that the U.S. faces need
tailoring to meet the present conflict. The Cold War highlighted
that a long ideological war can be successfully prosecuted and
ultimately won in the face of great tensions between two
branches of government. A third branch is certainly necessary to
arbiter the major constitutional disputes that may arise between
the other two branches of government. The regulation of tactics
in the interests of national security, however, such as wiretapping
foreign powers or agents of foreign powers, are political
decisions that should not be outsourced to the unelected realm
of third-party court work.
223. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (outlining arguments for new
approach to better trail Al Qaeda).
224. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (the counterargument to any
suggestion that without judicial review of particular national security tactics the republic
is dead).
225. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (fulfilling original intent argument).
226. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (even though the Cold War and War
on Terror differ with respect to tactics, strategic imperatives are similar).
THE NEXT U.S. COLD WARRIOR
This is as much a legal analysis as it is a moral imperative. It
is not to unqualifiedly endorse the adoption of either the
German or British model of national security wiretapping, but to
look to our European allies for ways to improve upon the U.S.
approach. The United States faces a momentous challenge, one
that is akin to the Cold War contest. Yet it entails a new strategy.
The United States has lacked the same seriousness of purpose as
it had in fighting Soviet communism by ironically continuing to
employ tactics and strategies that were then applicable but now
obsolete. Looking back on the Cold War, what is most
remarkable is the effectiveness of the incessant barrage of
propaganda in maintaining the U.S. attention span over nearly
half a century.2 2 7 Overhyping the potentiality of nuclear war and
the cohesiveness of communism across the globe, both
Democratic and Republican administrations were able to
cultivate a national interest in the nation's security interests.
That notice and concentration is sorely lacking in the current
War against Terror. The dangers of hyperbolic rhetoric and
distractive responses from the real threat, such as the invasions of
peripheral venues of concern like Korea and Vietnam during the
Cold War and Iraq during the War on Terror, are tragically real.
And this Note is under no delusion that there will always be the
potential for abuse when wiretapping, but its excesses will not be
responsible for the deaths of soldiers and civilians in a far away
desert or jungle. It is the best chance the United States has to
preserve lives both at home and abroad. To the credit of
President Bush, he understood its vitality.
The War on Terror is real. We owe the victims resting in the
rubble of Ground Zero to remember the rawness of September
11, 2001 and to never allow its repetition. The current British
and German models on wiretapping exhibit a sophistication that
the United States must too acquire to prevent another 9/11,
while realizing that such a model must be consistent with our
federal system and traditions. It is from the triumph of the Cold
War and the tragedy of 9/11 that the United States can find
inspiration and motivation, but by the example of the Europeans
that the United States will find a recipe for success.
227. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (demonstrating how exaggerated fears
of international communist unity encouraged public awareness).
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